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MYTH OF THE COLOR-BLIND JUDGE:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RACIAL
HARASSMENT CASES
PAT K. CHEW
ROBERT E. KELLEY*

ABSTRACT
In this Article, we present an exploratory empirical study of federal
workplace racial harassment cases that span a twenty-year period.
Multiple analysesfound thatjudges'racesignificantly affects outcomes in
workplace racial harassment cases. African American judges rule
differently than White judges, even when one takes into account their
political affiliation or certain characteristics of the case. Our findings
further suggest thatjudges of all races are attentive to the relevantfacts of
the cases but may reach different conclusions depending on their races.
When race, political affiliation, and certain case characteristicsare all
consideredsimultaneously, the role that race plays loses some statistical
significance (as one might expect given the increasing number of
variables).
While we cannot predict how an individual judge might act, our
empirical analysis suggests that African American judges as a group and
White judges as a group perceive racial harassment differently. These
findings counter the traditionalmyth that the race of a judge would not
make a difference-a myth premised on a presumption of a formalistic and
objective decision-makingprocess.
Given the underrepresentation of minority judges, the growing
minority population in the U.S., and minority skepticism of judicial
fairness, this Article offers empirical supportfor a more racially diverse

* Pat Chew is a professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and Robert Kelley is a
professor at Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business. We thank John Scott, Mindy
Chou, Kathleen Bulger Gray, Jesse Reyes, Michele Ruscio, and Valerie Weiss for their indispensable
statistical consultation and research assistance. We are indebted to Robin Barnes, Theresa Beiner,
Deborah Brake, Richard Delgado, Michael Olivas, Lu-in Wang, John Scott, and Cassia Spohn for their
careful reviews of the article and their insightful suggestions. Our research was presented to a range of
audiences, including judges, lawyers, legal academics, and social scientists at a symposium hosted by
the Judicial Division of the American Bar Association and SMU University, the annual meeting of the
National Consortium for Racial and Ethnic Fairness in State Courts, and the interdisciplinary
Intergroup Relations group of the University of Pittsburgh Center on Race and Social Problems. We
appreciate their helpful suggestions.

1117

1118

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:1117

judiciary. An increase in the number of judges of color promises to
increase diverse perspectives in the judicial system and to help unveil the
complex reality of racialdynamics in the workplace.
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Our experiences instantly become part of the lens through which we
view our entire past, present,1 and future, and like any lens, they
shape and distortwhat we see.
I. INTRODUCTION

In today's political climate, congressional and presidential partisanship
have created a gauntlet for any judicial appointee and a quagmire of
unfilled judicial posts. 2 Legislators fight over the appropriate political,
racial, and gender composition of the judiciary3 and 4debate the projected
rulings of candidates of particular political bona fides.
While the judiciary has become more racially diverse, it remains
homogeneously White and hardly reflects the diversity of the American
society it serves. 5 Understandably then, a range of politicians, scholars,
and the judiciary itself continues to press for a more racially diverse and
representative bench.6

1. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS

49

(2007).

2. For discussions of the contentious political maneuvering in this process, see generally LEE
EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
(2005); NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL

COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2005); Lisa M. Holmes, Research Note, Why "Go Public"?
PresidentialUse of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 110 (2008);
Tajuana D. Massie et al., The Timing of PresidentialNominations to the Lower Federal Courts, 57
POL. RES. Q. 145 (2004).
3. For examples of disagreements over the gender and race of judicial nominees, see Theresa
M. Beiner, How the Contentious Nature of FederalJudicial Appointments Affects "Diversity" on the
Bench, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 849, 851-55 (2005) (suggesting more contentious nature of confirmation
process for women and minority nominees for the federal judiciary, as indicated by lengthier time
periods from their nomination to hearing to confirmation); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Representative
Government, Representative Court? The Supreme Court as a RepresentativeBody, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1252, 1252-58 (2006).
4.

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
JudicialBackground on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie
L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of the Appointment Method in
EstablishingGender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 504 (2002); Roger E. Hartley
& Lisa M. Holmes, The IncreasingSenate Scrutiny of Lower Federal CourtNominees, 117 POL. SC.
Q. 259 (2002).
5. See discussion infra Part JI.A-I.B.
6. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, AM. BAR ASS'N, COMM'N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC
DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, MILES TO Go: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 57 (2004); LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, ANSWERING THE CALL
FOR A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY: A REVIEW OF STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION MODELS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON DIVERSITY 2-3 (2005) [hereinafter LAWYERS' COMM.]; Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive

(But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597
(2003); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on
State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A

1120

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:1117

What difference will it make if we have a more racially diverse
judiciary? Some argue that greater diversity among judges would provide
minority role models and that public confidence in the judiciary system
would be enhanced. 7 Others argue that having more judges of color may
substantively improve the judicial decision-making process
by increasing
8
judicial impartiality and yielding fairer legal outcomes.
But do these benefits actually occur and are there accompanying costs?
Researchers are just beginning to explore and answer these questions. In
the past, so few minority judges sat on the bench that studying them would
yield little generalizable information. While the numbers are still relatively
small, there are enough judges that we can now begin to do preliminary
analyses. 9 In addition, while empirical research is still fairly novel in legal
10

scholarship, it is emerging as an important and relevant form of analysis.

At the same time, scholars have begun to deploy innovative research
methods for understanding the cognitive processes of judicial decision
making, including the possible roles of race and prejudice in those
processes.ll

PrincipledApproach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5
(2004); Patricia Yancey Martin et al., Gender Bias and Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and
Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 SIGNS 665 (2002); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at
1252-58; Joy Milligan, Note, Pluralismin America: Why JudicialDiversity Improves Legal Decisions
About PoliticalMorality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 407 n.2 (2000) (citing others' recognition of these
benefits); LAWYERS' COMM., supranote 6,at 2,29.
An increased number of minority judges may also increase the pool of minority lawyers in the
pipeline for the judiciary. As the number of minority judges increases, they would be a more visible
presence in the judiciary. This increased visibility might inspire minority individuals to enter legal
training and allow them to envision themselves as future judges.
8. See, e.g., CHAMBLISS, supranote 6, at 57; Ifill, supra note 7, at 411 (arguing "racial diversity
on the bench also encourages judicial impartiality"); Milligan, supra note 6, at 1240-45 (discussing
how racial diversity of judiciary increase judges' openness to disparate answers); see also Beiner,
supra note 6; Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Meanfor Justice?, 6 MICH. J.
GENDER& L. 113 (1999).
9. See infra Parts III-IV.

10. See infra Part III.
11. See, e.g.,
Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (describing how contemporary psychological research on the human mind

and their own empirical research allowed them to posit a judicial "intuitive-override" model of
decision making); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI.
427, 431 (2007) (describing the "Implicit Association Test" which measures latency responses to
different race-related stimuli). Nonetheless, very complex issues make the research process daunting,
including determining the relevant factors when studying the role of judges' race in their decision
making. Possible considerations are the type of court, the type of case, the legal issues, characteristics
of the parties, and the racial and gender composition of an appellate judicial panel.
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This Article begins with a brief overview of the racial diversity of the
judiciary of both the federal and state courts, including the degree to which
they reflect the racial diversity of American society. 12 Next follows an
introduction to the social science research on judicial decision making. 13 In
particular, we discuss studies on how personal
attributes of judges, such as
14
race, relate to their judicial deliberations.
We then turn to our own empirical study of judges' race and their
15
decision making in federal court cases on workplace racial harassment.
While we focus on the judges' race, 16 we also consider how the judges'
political affiliation 17 and how the plaintiff-employees' particular claims of
racial harassment affect who wins. 18 Racial harassment cases are a
particularly appropriate context for these inquiries because the relevant
laws require judges to tap their discretionary judgment on race-related
matters. 19 In addition, the thousands of racial harassment claims 20 make
understanding judicial decision making in these cases urgent.
Our exploratory empirical study, the first on the role of judges' race in
racial harassment cases, resulted in striking findings. 21 We learned that
judges' race matters very much in how cases turn out, but not necessarily
in predictable ways. For example, African American judges rule quite
differently from White judges. The judges' political affiliation and the
merits of the case also can play a part. The study's results bring both
comfort and consternation to those who think that judicial decision making
is a totally rational and objective process.

12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra PartIII.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Parts IV-VI.
16. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-V.A.
17. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, V.B.
18. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, V.C.
19. See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
20. Over 7000 racial harassment complaints were filed in 2007. Telephone Interview with
Stephanie Aiken Murphy, Program Analyst, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n (Mar. 7,
2008). For general statistics on all race-based complaints and all harassment-related complaints, see
EEOC, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2009).
21. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-VI.
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COLOR OF THE JUDICIARY

A. RacialRepresentation in the Judiciary
Data on the racial diversity of the judiciary are now available from

various sources. These data reveal that, although a minority judge is not
the rare phenomenon it was decades ago, 23 the American judiciary
continues to be overrepresented by Whites. As we discuss below, this
overrepresentation persists in both the federal and state courts.
In the federal courts, out of a total of 805 active judges, non-White
judges constitute about 19% of the bench.24 As shown in Chart 1, 11% of
judges are African Americans, 7% are Hispanic,25 and fewer than 1% are
Asian Americans. Minority representation is lower at the federal appellate
level than at the district court level. 26 Currently, no Native American
judges sit on the federal judiciary at all,27 and no Asian Americans sit at
the appellate level.28 As Lawrence Baca, a Native American and former

22. CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 56 (discussing increase in sources). Data on the federal
judiciary are accessible through the Federal Judicial Center. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the
United States Courts, Biographical Directory of Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last
visited Feb. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Directory of Federal Judges]. Its website provides biographical data
about the federal judiciary, including, for example, judges' race, gender, and party of the nominating
president. Id.
The Directory of Federal Judges indicates that judges' races, whenever possible, are based on selfdefinition. Id.(follow the About the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges link). See also
CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 53-57. Data on the racial diversity of state judges are also online.
American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, National Database on
Judicial Diversity in State Courts, http://www.abanet.org/judind/diversity/national.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2008) [hereinafter State Courts]. See also LAWYERS' COMM., supranote 6, at 9.
23. Two decades ago, there were only four African American federal judges, compared to eighty
White judges and eighty-nine total judges. Thus, African Americans represented 4.5% of the federal
bench at that time. These data were found by searching for active sitting African American judges,
White judges, and all judges commissioned before January 1, 1989 on the Directory of Federal Judges.
Directory of Federal Judges, supranote 22 (search last ran Mar. 10, 2009).
24. See Table A, infra note 31; Chart 1 (combining the percentages of the minority judges).
25. While we could have used the also prevalent term Latinos/Latinas, we chose Hispanic not as
a political statement, but because the U.S. Census Bureau and the Federal Judicial Centers are key
sources of data used in this Article, and they used the term Hispanic. ELIZABETH M. GRIECO &
RACHEL C. CASSIDY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU OVERVIEW OF RACE & HISPANIC ORIGIN: CENSUS 2000

BRIEF (2001); Directory of Federal Judges, supranote 22 (Hispanic category indicated when searching
for race of judges). The U.S. Census Bureau uses the term "Hispanic" to describe individuals who selfidentified as "Spanish/Hispanic/Latino" including those who further marked themselves as Mexican,
Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, or Cuban. GRIECO & CASSIDY, supra, at 1.
26. Sixteen percent of the courts of appeals is minority, and 20% of the district courts is
minority. See Table A, infra note 31 (calculating percentages from numbers given there).
27. See Table A, infra note 31. Two Native Americans had been appointed to the federal
judiciary in the past, but none currently sit on the bench. Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 22
(identifying Billy Michael Burrage and Frank Howell Seay as the only two Native American jurists).
28. See Table A, infra note 31.
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chair of the ABA Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the
Profession, reports, he has been before a minority judge only once in his
twenty-seven-year career at the Department of Justice. 29 Baca observed
that he would likely retire from30practice "'without ever once appearing
before a judge of my own race.'
CHART 1: FEDERAL JUDGES BY RACE

Hispanic
7.2%

31

Asian
American

0.7%
African
American
11% A

White
81%

In the state courts, minority representation is even less than in the
federal courts. Minority judges represent approximately 10% of the bench
at all state court levels, 32 as shown in Chart 2. African Americans

CHAMBLISS, supranote 6, at 57.
30. Id. (quoting Lawrence Baca, Observations on the Importance of Diversity in the Law Office:
One Indian's Perspective 8 (unpublished essay on file with Elizabeth Chambliss)).
31. The percentages in Chart 1 are based on the numbers shown below in Table A, which the
authors compiled from data in the Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 22, by searching for judges
by race and court level.
TABLE A: FEDERAL JUDGES
29.

Federal Judges by Race (Numbers)
Court
White African American Hispanic Asian American Native American Total
Supreme Court
8
1
0
0
0
9
Courts ofAppeals
137
14
12
0
0 163
District Courts
507
74
46
6
0 633
Total
652
89
58
6
0 805
32. This percentage is calculated from data provided in Table B, infra note 34. Minority
representation is 9.8% at the trial court, 10.4% at the intermediate appellate court, 9 .7 % at the state
supreme court, and 9.9% in the aggregate.
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constitute fewer than 6%, Hispanics fewer than 3%, Asian Americans
1.1%, and Native Americans 0.1%. Minority judges predominantly
serve
33
in the state trial courts rather than state appellate courts.
CHART 2: STATE JUDGES BY RACE

34

Asian

American

Hipaic
Hisp%

Hispanc1.1

African
Ame
5.9%ca

Native
American
0at1%
01%

ricanc

Other
0.2%

White
89.9%

33. See Table B, infra note 34.
34. The percentages in Chart 2 are based on the numbers shown below in Table B, which the
authors compiled from data from State Courts, supra note 22.
TABLE B: STATE JUDGES

Court
African
White

State Supreme Courts
Intermediate Appellate Courts
Trial Courts
Total

307
856
9037
10,200

State Judges by Race (Numbers)
Asian
Native

American Hispanic American American Other

20
60
585
665

8
25
287
320

5
13
104
122

0
2
11
13

Total

0
340
2
958
22 10,046
24 11,344
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CHART 3:

ALL JUDGES BY RACE

Other
0.2%

Asian
American
1.1%/

Hispanic
3.1%

35

Native
American

\,
African
American
A.2%

0.1%

White
89.3%

As shown in Chart 3, combining both federal and state courts, the
percentages of judges by race are similar to those in the state courts. Of a
total of over 12,000 judges, White judges constitute approximately 90%

and minority judges constitute approximately 10%.36 African American

35. The percentages for Chart 3 are based on Table C below, which the authors compiled from
the data given in Table A, supra note 31, and Table B, supra note 34.
TABLE C: ALL JUDGES

All Judges by Race (Numbers)
State Judges
10,200

Federal Judges
652

Total
10,852

African American

665

89

754

Hispanic

320

58

378

Asian American

122

6

128

Native American

13

0

13

Other

24

0

24

Total

11,344

805

12,149

White

36. These percentages are based on the percentages in Chart 3. Minority judges consist of African
American, Hispanic, Asian American, and Native American judges.
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and Hispanic judges together constitute about 90% of all the minority
37
judges.
B. JudicialDiversity in Context
1. Racial UnderrepresentationRelative to the General Population
The practical significance of this paucity of minority judges comes into
focus when one compares their representation to that of the general
population. In theory, if the judiciary is open to all individuals regardless
of race, one would expect minority representation in the judiciary to reflect
minority representation in the general population. Instead, as described
below, a dramatic discrepancy exists between minority representation on
the bench and in American society generally.
TABLE 1: MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN GENERAL POPULATION

African Americans
Hispanics
Asian Americans
Native Americans 39

38

12.3%
12.5%
3.6%
1.0%

Comparing Table 1 and Chart 3, while minorities constitute about 30%
of the general population, only about 10% of the judiciary is of color.40
More specifically, over 12% of the general population is African
American, while African American judges represent about 6% of the
overall judiciary. Among Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Native
Americans, the disparity is even greater. Hispanics represent about 12.5%
in the general population, about four times their representation on the
judiciary. Similarly, Asian Americans constitute 3.6% of the general
population, over three times their representation on the bench. Meanwhile,
Native Americans are underrepresented by a factor of ten. Moreover, this
summary likely underestimates the underrepresentation of minority
judges, given that the most current census data for the general population

37. This percentage is calculated from data in Chart 3 and Table C, supra note 35.
38. Table 1 is compiled from data taken from GRIECO & CASSIDY, supra note 25, at 3.
39. This percentage includes both (1) American Indians and Alaska Natives, and (2) Native
Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders. Id.
40. Adding all the percentages in Table 1 equals 29.4%. Adding the percentages in Chart 3 for
African American, Hispanic, Asian American, and Native American judges equals 10. 5 %.
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are from 2000 and minority populations have markedly increased in the
41
last eight years.
Disaggregating the data on state and federal judges provides additional
insights into racial diversity in the two systems. By comparing the data in
Table 1 and Chart 2, we see that state court judges reflect extreme
underrepresentation among every racial minority group. In contrast, by
comparing the data in Table 1 and Chart 1, we find that while federal court
judges also underrepresent minorities as a whole, the level of
underrepresentation varies with each racial group. Hispanics number
almost twice the representation in the general population as in the federal
judiciary. Asian Americans have over five times the representation in the
general population than in the federal judiciary, indicating the greatest
underrepresentation among minority groups except for Native Americans.
As indicated earlier, Native Americans are not represented at all on the
federal bench." On the other hand, the representation of African
Americans in the federal judiciary suggests a positive direction, with
12.3% representation in the general population and 11.1% representation
in the federal judiciary.
2. Racial Diversity in the Bar andAmong PresidentialAppointments
The racial diversity of lawyers is also relevant to our understanding of
the diversity of judges. Judges are typically selected from among lawyers,
so a lack of minority lawyers would make it more challenging to build a
racially diverse judiciary and might explain in part the scarcity of minority
judges. In fact, minorities are dramatically underrepresented among
lawyers. 45 In 2000, about 4% of lawyers were African American, 3.3%
were Hispanic, 2.3% were Asian American, and 0.2% were Native
American.4 6 Combined, minority lawyers constituted less than 10% of the

41. TIME Magazine, for instance, reported in 2006 that Hispanics represented 14 .8% and Asian
Americans 4.4% of the population. Kathleen Adams et al., America By the Numbers, TIME, Oct. 30,
2006, at 44.
42. Hispanics represent 12.5% of the general population and 7.2% of the federal bench. See
supra Chart 1; see also supranote 38 and accompanying text.
43. Asian Americans represent 3.6% of the general populations and 0. 7 % of the federal bench.
See supra Chart 1; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
45.

See CHAMBLISS, supranote 6, at 5.

46. Id. Chambliss also indicates that minority representation among lawyers is less than in some
other professions including physicians and surgeons, computer scientists, and accountants. Id. at 6-7.
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bar even though minorities constituted nearly 30% of the general
population.47
The small number of minority lawyers relative to the general
population, however, is not a complete explanation for the lack of minority
judges. Although having more minority lawyers has many benefits,
including providing a bigger pool of talented judicial candidates, a lack of
minority lawyers does not appear to be the real constraint on the
appointment of more minority judges. Indeed, there are many minorities in
the legal profession who would appear to have the prima facie
qualifications to be judges. For example, between 2002 and 2003, there
was a substantial pool of successful minority legal professionals to
consider: 65 minority Congressional representatives, over 500 minority
full professors in law schools, and over 18,000 minority partners in the
country's largest law firms. 48 As further evidence that there already is a
pool of qualified minority candidates, consider the fact that some
Presidents were able to identify and appoint minority judicial nominees.
As shown in Table 2, over 20% of the judicial appointments by Presidents
Carter and Clinton were minorities.
TABLE 2: PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS BY JUDGES' RACE/ETHNICITY 49
African
American
Total (O)
Nixon (1969-74)
Ford (1974-76)

227
65

Carter (1977-80)
Reagan (1981-88)

6 (2.6)

Asian
Native
Total
Hispanic American American Minority
(%)
(N)
(N)
(O)
2 (0.9)
1(1.5)

1(0.4)
2 (3.1)

258

3f(4.)
37(14.3)

16 (6.2)

378

7(1.9)

13 (3.4)

Bush (1989-92)
Clinton (1993-2000)

192
378

11(5.7)
62 (16.4)

Bush (2001-07)

276

20 (7.2)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

10 (4.4)
6 (9.2)

2 (0.8)

1(0.4)

56 (21.7)

2 (0.5)

0 (0.0)

22 (5.8)

8(4.2)
24 (6.3)

1(0.5)
5 (1.3)

0(0.0)
1(0.3)

20(10.4)
92 (24.3)

27 (9.8)

2 (0.9)

0 (0.0)

49 (17.6)

The data in Table 2 also indicate that Presidents vary in the percentage
of their judicial appointments that are minority. In contrast to Presidents
Carter and Clinton, Presidents Reagan (5.8%) and George H. Bush
(10.4%) appointed a much lower percentage of minority judges. The

47. Id. at 5, 63-64 (combining percentages of minority lawyers and discussing representation of
each racial group); supra Table 1 (providing minority representation in the general population).
48. CHAMBLISS, supranote 6, at 51, 58, 30.
49. Table 2 was compiled from CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 55 (data for Presidents Nixon
through Clinton), and the Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 22 (obtained on Feb. 27, 2008) (data
for President George W. Bush).
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second President Bush's appointment of minority judges (17.6%) was
closer to the percentage of minority judges appointed by Presidents Carter
and Clinton. In the aggregate, Democratic administrations contributed
more to the racial diversity of the judiciary than Republican
administrations between 1969 and 2007. Minority judges constituted
approximately 23% of all judicial appointments by Democratic presidents
in contrast to 9.5% of all judicial appointments by Republican presidents
during that period.50

III. RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AND JUDGES' RACE
While the empirical study of judicial decision making by legal scholars
is fairly recent, researchers in other disciplines have produced a significant
body of literature on this topic. Political scientists, in particular, have
considered how certain characteristics of judges, such as their political
affiliation, are indicators of their ideological attitudes and voting
patterns. 51 Given their training, they are especially astute at observing
judicial decision making in the political environment in which courts
operate. For instance, numerous studies analyze the political affiliation of
Supreme Court justices5 2 and its relationship to their voting patterns in
different types of cases.
Although new to this research area, legal scholars are uniquely
positioned to contribute. Given their legal training, they are careful
observers of the nuances of judicial decision making and are in a unique
position to apply empirical analysis to legal issues. 3 Moreover, traditional
legal scholarship tends to have little or no empirical content, so by
comparison, the emerging empirical research by legal scholars is

50. The percentages were calculated by taking the total number of judges appointed during this
period, as shown in Table 2, and determining what percent were appointed by Republican Presidents

and by Democratic Presidents.
51. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When,
andHow Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1483 (2007); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995); C. Neal Tate, Personal
Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties
and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978,75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 355 (1981).
52. See supranote 51.
53. In employment discrimination cases, for instance, courts have recognized the value of more
sophisticated statistical methods, such as regression analysis. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S.

385, 400 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). Other key judicial opinions on employment discrimination
laws value as evidence the results of more basic statistical methods, such as calculating frequencies,
percentages, and cross-tabulations. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,

342 n.23 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306-13 (1977).
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developing the particular blend of social science and legal research that is

most appropriate to legal issues.
While both social scientists and legal scholars doing empirical research
in this area may not state their beliefs directly, they implicitly make certain
assumptions about the way judges reach decisions and how the law
operates.54 In particular, they adhere to a more realist model of judicial
decision making, which argues that judges, like other people, are affected
in their decision making by social forces and their own experiences and
values.55 Thus, judges' characteristics, such as their race, gender, and
political affiliation, would be meaningful because they help us better
understand how judges interpret the facts, apply often unclear legal
principles, and reach legal conclusions.
This model of judicial decision making is an uncomfortable one for
legal scholars who adhere to a more formalist model of judges. 6
Formalists tend to view judges as arbiters of justice who assess the facts
and interpret the law in a rational and more mechanical way consistent
with well-established legal principles. 7 Thus, judges are not likely

54. A fundamental assumption is that an array of judicial characteristics is identifiable and
measurable. Some characteristics, such as judges' race, age, sex, education, and work experiences are
objectively determinable and typically self-reported. However, we recognize that some of these
characteristics, such as race, are socially constructed, and that an ongoing debate about the usefulness
and appropriateness of these commonly used categories continues. See, e.g., PETER SKERRY,
COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?: RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS 51-59 (2000);

Charles Hirschman et al., The Meaning and Measurement of Race in the U.S. Census: Glimpses into
the Future, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 381, 381, 390 (2000). Other characteristics, however, are not typically
self-reported, so they need to be measured in some other way. For example, since the political party of
judges is not readily ascertainable, researchers use the political party of the nominating President as a
reasonable proxy for the political affiliation of the judge. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics
and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1995); Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996 (June 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago) (on file with authors). The reasoning is that a judge nominated by a Republican President is
likely, even if not a member of the Republican Party, to share political ideology similar to
Republicans.
55. There are parallels in social psychology to this model of judicial decision making. For
instance, social psychologists explain human behavior and decision making in part by a consideration
of social forces and life experiences. See, e.g., HENRY GLEITMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY 379-99 (6th

ed. 2004) (describing social impact theory). In addition, there are also parallels to the realist model of
judicial decision making, as described by legal scholars. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); Guthrie et al., supra note 11, at 2-3; Burt Neurorne, Essay, Of Sausage
Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 419, 420 (1992); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1138, 1145-48 (1999)
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).

(reviewing

ANTHONY

SEBOK,

LEGAL

POSITIVISM

IN

AMERICAN

56. For discussions on the formalist model ofjudicial decision making, see, for example, Guthrie
et al., supranote 11, at 2-3; Leiter, supranote 55, at 1145-48; Neurome, supranote 55, at 420.
57. See Leiter, supranote 55, at 1144-45.
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influenced by personal attitudes and values because their role does not

allow much discretion.
Increasingly, however, more legal scholars are acknowledging that
judges have human inclinations and that judges' ability to be purely

objective about the case may be largely theoretical.58 Many sensitive
questions remain, however, on what those human inclinations are, when
they come into play, and how they affect judicial decision making.
A wide range of studies considers how the personal attributes and
backgrounds of judges influences how they rule. 59 Some study federal

courts while others consider state courts. 60 The subject of cases varies,
ranging from criminal law cases to employment law.61 Until fairly

recently, research did not include the judges' genders or races. However,
with a more diverse judiciary, researchers are beginning to focus on these

58. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 11, at 19-28; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive
Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment
Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835 (2004); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and
Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1278-79 (2005); Richard A.
Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT.
REv. 1, 1-7 (1993).
59.

See, e.g., CASsiA L. SPoUN, How Do JUDGES DECIDE? 101-17 (2002); Ashenfelter et al.,

supra note 4; Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDICATURE 129 (1993); John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25
AM. J. POL. SCI. 308 (1981); Josh Hsu, Asian American Judges: Identity, Their Narratives,& Diversity
on the Bench, 11 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 92 (2006); Carol T. Kulik et al., Here Comes the Judge:
The Influence of Judge PersonalCharacteristicson Federal Sexual Harassment Case Outcomes, 27
HUM. BEHAv. 69 (2003); Kenneth L. Manning et al., Does Age Matter? Judicial Decision Making in
Age Discrimination Cases, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 1 (2004); Patricia Yancey Martin et al., Gender Bias and
Feminist ConsciousnessAmong Judges and Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 SIGNS 665
(2002); Daniel M. Schneider, Statutory Construction in FederalAppellate Tax Cases: The Effects of
Judges' Social Backgrounds and of Other Aspects of Litigation, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 257 (2003); Donald
R. Songer et al., A Reappraisalof Diversificationin the FederalCourts: Gender Effects in the Courts
of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425 (1994); Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L Britt, Judges'Race and Judicial
Decision Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 Soc. ScI. Q. 749 (2001); Darrell
Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge's Gender Affect the
Sentencing of CriminalDefendants?, 77 Soc. FORCES 1163 (1998); Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite
Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POL. SC'. 884 (1978); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and CollegialDecisonmaking in the FederalAppellate Courts, 114
YALE L.J. 1759 (2005); Crowe, supra note 54; Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Taking Sides: The Impact
of Judicial Gender on Decisions in Divorce Law (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Washington University Law Review); Tajuana Massie et al., The Impact of Gender and Race in the
Decisions of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Washington University Law Review).
60. E.g., Ifill, supra note 6 (state trial courts); Kulik et al., supra note 59 (federal cases);
Manning et al., supra note 59 (federal district courts); Martin & Pyle, supra note 59 (state courts);
Massie et al., supranote 59 (federal courts of appeal).
61. E.g., SPOUN, supra note 59 (criminal sentencing decisions); Kulik et al., supra note 59
(sexual harassment law); Manning et al., supra note 59 (criminal law); Massie et al., supra note 59
(criminal procedure, civil rights cases); Schneider, supranote 59 (federal tax law).
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traits, sometimes in combination with other attributes such as the judges'
62
ages or political affiliations. The results of this empirical research are not
consistent. Some studies find little relationship between the judges'
attributes and their decision making, while others find significant
63
64
patterns. This area of research is clearly in the early stages.
Nonetheless, research on judges' race is emerging, as the small but
notable increase in minority judges has made empirical research more
meaningful. For example, researchers are wondering if disturbing legal
trends related to race and sentencing might be linked to the judge's own
race. 65 Could the disparities in the sentencing of criminal defendants from
different racial groups, for instance, be linked to the race of the 66presiding
judges, or do alternative explanations account for the disparities?
The works of Cassia Spohn,67 Nancy Crowe, 8 Adam Cox and Thomas
Miles 69 illustrate the emerging research on the role of the judge's race in
judicial decision making. Prompted in part by the racial disparities in the
sentencing of criminal defendants, Spohn reviewed others' research and
conducted her own studies on judicial decision making in this setting.70 In
a survey of research on the judges' race, she found contradictory results.71
Some studies noted differences in the sentencing behavior of African
72
American and White judges, while others found little or none. She found

62. E.g., SPOHN, supra note 59 (race and gender); Gruhl et al., supra note 59 (gender); Hsu,
supra note 59 (race); Kulik, supra note 59 (gender, race, age, and political affiliation); Martin et al.,
supra note 59 (gender); Songer et al., supra note 59 (gender); Peresie, supra note 59 (gender); Martin
& Pyle, supranote 59 (gender); Massie et al., supranote 59 (gender and race); Crowe, supra note 54
(gender and race).
Interestingly, research on the relationship of judges' gender to their decision making is already
more prevalent and more varied than on judges' race. Perhaps this is because female judges outnumber
minority judges, thus providing a larger base to study. Or, perhaps more researchers are interested in
gender issues than race issues, despite the critical importance of both topics. See Pat K. Chew, Freeing
Racial Harassmentfrom the Sexual HarassmentModel, 85 OR. L. REv. 615, 618 (2006) (noting the
relative lack of research on racial harassment law, in comparison to research on sexual harassment
law).
63. To illustrate, consider Spohn's discussion of research on the race of judges and its
relationship to criminal sentencing. See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
64. Given that this field is still in its development stage, scholars are debating the appropriate
research methodology. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Age (Really) Matter? A
Response to Manning, Carroll,and Carp,85 Soc. SCi. Q. 19 (2004); Manning et al., supranote 59.
65. SPOHN, supranote59, at 179-208.
66. Id. at 165-218.
67. SPOHN, supranote 59.
68. Crowe, supranote 54.
69. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(2008).
70. SPOHN, supranote59, at 165-218.
71. Id. at 106-10.
72. Id.
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in her own study of sentencing of violent felons in Detroit that judges as a
group did discriminate and impose harsher sentences on African American
than on White offenders.73 Contrary to her expectations, however, both
African American and White judges imposed these harsher sentences.74
She speculated that both African American and White judges might think
of African American offenders as more threatening and dangerous than
their White counterparts.7 5 In addition, at least some of the discriminatory
treatment of African American offenders by African American judges
might be attributable to their sympathy toward and identification with
African American victims. 76 In other words, African American judges may
see themselves more as potential victims of black-on-black crime and do
not particularly empathize with African American criminals. In this
connection, Spohn noted a study of sentencing by White and Hispanic
judges in El Paso, Texas.77 That study found that Hispanic judges imposed
similar sentences on Hispanic and White offenders but that White judges
gave more lenient sentences to White offenders. 78 Hispanic judges, like
their African American counterparts, might view themselves as victims of
crimes by both Hispanic and Whites perpetrators, while White judges
might see Hispanic criminals as a greater threat than White ones.
Nancy Crowe studied the effects of judges' sex and race on judicial
decision making in sex and race discrimination cases. 79 After looking at
twelve federal courts of appeal over a fifteen year period, she found that
the sex of judges makes a difference in sex discrimination cases but not in
race discrimination cases.80 In particular, female judges were more likely
than male judges to vote in favor of the plaintiffs, who are most typically
women, 81 in sex discrimination cases. 82 In contrast, female judges did not

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
against

Id. at 108-10.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
Id. As the authors of that study hypothesized: "'Anglo judges are not so much discriminating
Hispanic defendants as they are favoring members of their ethnic group."' Id. (quoting M.D.

Holmes et al., Judges' Ethnicity and Minority Sentencing: Evidence Concerning Hispanics, 74 SOC.

So. Q. 496, 502 (1993)).
79. Crowe, supranote 54.
80. Id. at 80-81, 110-11. Crowe also found that judges' political partisanship played a role.
Judges appointed by a Democratic President (both African American and White Democratic judges)
were much more likely than those appointed by a Republican President to vote for plaintiffs in both
sex discrimination and race discrimination cases. Id. at 80, 111.
81. See Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual HarassmentCases, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 548, 595 (2001).
82. Crowe, supranote 54, at 80.
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vote differently than male judges in race discrimination cases. 83 Crowe
posited that the gender of the judge may "only matter in areas of law
which deal explicitly with gender," and that "female judges [may] not
generalize [their identification with] sex discrimination plaintiffs to other
types of discrimination plaintiffs. 84 She found, however, that the race of
85
judges does make a difference in both sex and race discrimination cases.
Significant differences appeared in voting patterns: African American
judges held for plaintiffs nearly twice as often in sex discrimination cases
and over twice as often in race discrimination cases, as compared to White
judges. 86 As Crowe suggests, the race of the judge may be relevant in
cases that deal with race discrimination but also in cases that deal with
discrimination more broadly.8 7 Perhaps African 88American judges are
empathic to discriminatory experiences of all kinds.
Finally, Adam Cox and Thomas Miles studied all published federal
cases since 1982 that were decided under Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act. 89 The Voting Rights Act was enacted principally in response
to disenfranchisement of African Americans in the South, 90 and so, not
surprisingly, plaintiffs are often African Americans. 91 After controlling for
other factors, including the political party of the judges, Cox and Miles
92
found that the race of judges makes a difference in case outcomes.
African American judges are more than twice as likely as non-African
American judges (mostly White) to vote for Section Two liability.93
Moreover, they investigated whether the presence of an African American
judge on a judicial panel affects the votes of his or her colleagues. 94 They
found that it made a significant difference, with White judges more likely

83. Id.at 111.
84. Id. at 115.
85. Id. at 80-91, 110-11.
86. Id.
87. Id.at 134.
88. Id. at 116 (positing as a potential explanation that "African Americans, having been exposed
to more and perhaps different kinds of discrimination, are primed to see discrimination in ways and in
places that women are not.").
89. Cox & Miles, supra note 69, at 3.
90. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (discussing how the enacting
"Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.").
91. Cox & Miles, supra note 69, at 54.
92. Id.at 45, 48-49.
93. Id. at 30. African American judges voted in favor of liability 56 % of the time in contrast to
the non-African American judges voting to impose liability only 26 % of the time. Id.The authors note
that, given the relatively small number of votes by African American judges, this finding should be
interpreted cautiously. Id. at 30-31.
94. Id.at 34-37.
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to vote in favor of liability when they sit with an African American
colleague.9 5 The researchers theorized that White judges' view of the
merits of the case may change when they deliberate with African
American colleagues who share their different experiences and
96
information relating to discriminatory practices.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY: JUDGES' RACE IN RACIAL HARASSMENT CASES

Noting the absence of research on the subject, we conducted the first
study of the relationship between judges' race and the outcomes in racial
harassment in the workplace cases. This study builds on an earlier

empirical examination of the characteristics and patterns in racial
harassment cases that analyzed judicial opinions from a twenty-one year
time period-essentially the entire history of racial harassment case law
under federal laws up to 2002. 97 This earlier study found that employees

infrequently succeed in their racial harassment claims brought under
federal law: plaintiffs succeeded only 21.5% of the time. 98 Examining the
cases in more detail, this earlier study observed that plaintiffs in racial
harassment cases are overwhelmingly minorities, and most typically
African American, whose harassers tend to be White. 99
This current study further probes racial harassment cases by

considering whether the race of the judge is related to how these
proceedings end. The judges in the racial harassment cases in our study,

consistent with the racial profile of the federal judiciary generally, 100 are

95. Id. at 34-35.
96. Id. at 35-36.
97. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 53-54 (2006).
98. Id. at 54. The plaintiffs' success rates in studies of employment discrimination cases vary.
Compare Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discriminationin Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 889, 916 (2006) (finding 27% overall plaintiff win rate in race and national origin discrimination
cases), with Crowe, supra note 54, at 80, 110 (finding 4 8 % plaintiff win rate in sex discrimination and
45% in race discrimination cases), and Juliano & Schwab, supra note 81, at 594 (finding 48.2%
overall plaintiff win rate in sexual harassment cases, with 51.2% of the district court cases and 39% of
the appellate court cases). These variations may occur for a number of reasons, including: the level of
court (appellate versus district courts); the subject (e.g., all employment discrimination cases, sex
discrimination, race discrimination, sexual harassment, or racial harassment); the publication source
(official reporter system or all on-line cases); the time period studied; and the research methodology.
Our earlier study and the study described in this Article included district court cases and appellate
court cases, cases published in the official reporter system and those available only online, and cases
over a twenty-year time period. Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 76, 78, 98. We included all these
cases to obtain as representative a data set of racial harassment case law as possible.
99. See Chew & Kelley, supranote 97, at 96-109.
100. See discussion supraPart ILA.
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overwhelmingly White. In a typical racial harassment case, therefore, a
White judge hears an African American employee's complaint that White
supervisors or coworkers harassed her or him because of race. This
difference in the races of plaintiffs and judges is most meaningful, of
course, if the race of the judge makes a significant difference in her or his
decision making. As we subsequently demonstrate, our research indicates
that it does. 101 Moreover, judges' race is meaningful even when we take
into account judges' political affiliation. 10 2 For example, African
American Democratic judges rule differently than White Democratic

judges. 103
Racial harassment law is a particularly appropriate focus for this type
of research. This area of law allows judges considerable latitude. While
the fundamental legal principles for racial harassment cases are well
known, 10 4 they continue to evolve and are subject to varied and
subjective
10 5
interpretations that may well yield different legal conclusions.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 10 6 the Supreme Court recognized
that a discriminatory harassment claim, also called hostile environment
claim, is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "Title
VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult., 10 7 Unlike other race
discrimination cases where a particular employment practice or decision
(e.g., decision to hire, fire, or promote) is the focus of the discrimination
claim,108 racial harassment cases more typically involve supervisors' and
coworkers' day-to-day, often informal, use of abusive language and
behavior toward an employee because of her or his race.10 9 In a line of

101.

See discussion infra Parts IV.B-V.

102. See discussion infra Part V.B.
103. See discussion infra Part V.B.
104. Supreme Court cases have stated the key legal principles for the harassment doctrine. See
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-92 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 751-54 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-82 (1998);
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 66-69 (1986). These cases and their contributions to harassment jurisprudence are described
further in THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO
REFORMULATE SExUAL HARASSMENT LAW 15-20, 97-114 (2005).

105. Our earlier study of racial harassment cases, for instance, demonstrates that there is great
variability in how judges interpret the applicable legal principles. Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at
81-82.
106. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. 57.
107. Id.at 65.
108. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
109. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-67. As the Faragher case makes clear, however, a
"tangible employment action" can be an example of a supervisor's conduct, along with other harassing
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cases, the Supreme Court set forth the claim's key elements.110 First, the

harassment must be sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to alter the victim's
work conditions and result in a "hostile ...environment."

'

This severe

or pervasive standard must be met objectively (i.e., a reasonableness
standard) as well as subjectively by the plaintiff.112 Second, the harassment

must be because of race rather than being motivated by a reason unrelated
to race (such as an employee's incompetence or the boss's generally nasty
personality).,1 3 Although terms such as "severe or pervasive," "hostile

environment," and "because of race" are subject to myriad interpretations,
4

11
the Court has failed to provide clear guidance on their meanings.
Racial harassment law further enables one to study a rich and

representative sample of cases from a range of federal circuits and states
that span a significant time period.1 15 Since reported judicial opinions on
racial harassment cases arise most typically on defendants' motions for
summary judgment,1 6 these cases allow us to focus squarely on judges'
rather than juries' decision making. Finally, this area of law presents the
opportunity to study judicial decision making in cases where the racial
paradigm is of judges who are typically White, plaintiffs who are typically
minority, and legal issues that demand race-based factual analysis.

conduct, that serves as the factual foundation for a harassment claim. Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
110. See supra note 104. While all these Supreme Court cases involve sexual harassment fact
patterns, the Court has assumed that the principles laid out in sexual harassment cases and racial
harassment cases are interchangeable. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-66; Chew, supra
note 62, at 618-19.
111. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Faragher,524 U.S. at 787.
112. Faragher,524 U.S. at 787.
113. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S.
75 (1998) (exploring this attributional requirement in the context of sexual harassment).
114. In Harris,Justice Scalia acknowledged that the majority opinion's explanation of the legal
standards for a hostile environment claim were not very clear and left "virtually unguided" jurists and
juries to decide these cases. Harris,510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
115. See, e.g., Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 96-97, 75-77.
116. Id. at 78 tbl.10; Krieger, supra note 58, at 839 (noting few civil cases go to trial; rather, most
are disposed of through pretrial motions, most commonly motions for summary judgment). "To
survive a defense motion for summary judgment" and proceed to trial, the "plaintiff must convince the
judge that ...a reasonable jury, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility
conflicts against the employer, could render a verdict in the plaintiffs favor." Id. at 840. If the plaintiff
provides evidence "sufficient tocreate a genuine issue of material fact" on any element, the judge is
supposed to deny the defendant's motion. Id. As Krieger explains, in deciding summary motions,
judges use their intuition "to determine what inferences can 'reasonably' be drawn from any particular
set of facts." Id.
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A. Research Methodology
We designed a research process to identify representative cases and
judges so that any inferences we drew from the data would be as
generalizable as possible. We randomly selected forty percent of all
reported racial harassment cases from six federal circuits between 1981
and 2003.117 From these judicial opinions, we collected information on
each case (including characteristics of the parties, the nature of the alleged
harassment, and the outcome of the proceeding). We also collected
detailed biographical information on the presiding judge in each case
(including her or his race, gender, and political affiliation).1 18 A single
judge presided in district court cases, and a panel of three judges typically
sat in appellate court cases. Our study included a total of 256 different
judges, some of whom heard more than one case. Pairing each case with
each judge hearing the case yielded a total sample of 428 judge/case
pairs. 119 As indicated in Appendix A, for some variables we had data on
every case and every judge in the study, while in others the data were less
complete. We performed a number of descriptive and statistical analyses

117. We randomly sampled judicial opinions from West and LEXIS, including opinions
designated for the Federal Reporter system and opinions not so designated, from the First, Second,
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh federal circuits. These circuits represent different geographical
regions and include large states with racially diverse populations. Chew & Kelley, supranote 97, at 53
& n.8. Building on the data set from our prior study, we added judges' biographical data and updated
the cases an additional year, so that the data set for this study included cases between 1981 and 2003.
However, judicial opinions in West and LEXIS are not all judicial opinions since federal judges do not
release all their opinions to legal publishers, and these publishers do not necessarily publish all the
opinions they receive from the judges. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 62 & n.58.
118. See infra Appendix A (listing the collected information).
119. If the same judge presided over more than one of the cases, she or he was included for each
case. Therefore, it was possible for a particular judge in one case opinion to reach a decision that
favored the plaintiff and in another case opinion that favored the defendant. If the case was presided
over by three judges, which was the norm in appellate court cases, all three judges and their individual
votes were included in the study as three separate judge/case pairs since each judge made a decision on
the case before her or him. That is, each judge/case pair was considered to be an independent
observation in our analyses. The data set included 326 judge/case pairs from the district courts
(including opinions of magistrate judges) and 102 judge/case pairs from the appellate courts. See
Federal Judicial History, Magistrate Judges: A Brief History, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/magistratejudges (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (defining federal magistrate judge). Most of the
district court proceedings dealt with the defendant-employers' motion for summary judgment, and
most of the appellate court proceedings dealt with a party's appeal of the district courts' holding on a
motion for summary judgment. Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 77-78.
The data indicate similar case outcomes for judges in district courts (21.9% plaintiffs' success
rate) as compared to appellate courts (22.5%); magistrate judges (23.4%) as compared to other judges
(21.6%); single judges (22.4%) as compared to judges on panels (21.4%); and judges who heard more
than one case ( 2 3 .2 %) as compared to judges who heard only one case (1 9 .5 %). None of these
differences were statistically significant. Thus, we had further assurance that we could study all the
judge/case pairs as a whole without distinguishing between these various categories ofjudges.
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of the data, utilizing multiple methods to learn more about the relationship
of the judges' race to their decision making. 120 These processes included
cross-tabulations 121 and logistic regression modeling. 22 For our analyses,

120. First, we summarized the data that we had collected ("the data set"). Specifically, we counted
the number of judge/case pairs with particular characteristics ("frequency count" of each variable).
These frequency counts help us determine if our sample of cases and judges resembles the universe of
cases and judges. To the extent that our sample resembles the judiciary as a whole, then we have
additional assurance that our sample is representative and that we might draw inferences about judges
in all racial harassment cases with more confidence. In addition, the frequency counts help us decide if
we have enough data on any given characteristic to analyze it meaningfully.
Our frequency counts indicated that our data set reasonably resembles the racial and gender
composition of the federal judiciary as a whole, particularly when you take into account that the cases
in this study cover a twenty-two year time period and that the percentages of minority judges were
lower in the earlier part of this period than they are today. For instance, African American judges
represented 7.8% of the federal judiciary in 1994 and 11% in 2008..See supra Chart 1. African
American judges constituted 8.5% of our sample. Hispanic judges represented 4.8% of the federal
judiciary in 1994 and 7.2% in 2008. See supra Chart 1. Hispanic judges constituted 5.3% of our
sample. Thus, the number of cases with African American and Hispanic judges in our study, while
small, is a respectable sample, particularly given that the universe of minority federal judges is small
and evolving. In addition, the statistical procedures used in our study take into account the small
sample sizes. See infra notes 121-22. In particular, it is more difficult to establish statistically
significant differences when sample sizes are small. Thus, when significance is found under such
conditions, we have confidence that significant differences exist. Nonetheless, we view our study as
exploratory and make generalizations with care.
121. As a second step in our statistical analysis, we studied whether particular judges'
characteristics (e.g. race, gender, or political affiliation) were associated with the probability of
plaintiffs' success or defendants' success ("cross-tabulations"). Since we mostly had categorical
variables, we used cell sizes and percentages as summary statistics rather than means and standard
deviations. These cross-tabulations helped us assess the general decision-making patterns of different
groups ofjudges. We focused on case outcomes because they are an objectively determinable measure
ofjudges' decision making (i.e., whether they agreed with plaintiffs' or defendants' position), although
future research may look at more nuanced aspects of judicial decision making. We used chi-square
tests to determine whether these associations were statistically significant for tables where all cells had
expected frequency greater than five. For tables with at least one cell with low expected frequency
(<5),we used Fisher's exact test instead.
"Statistical significance" is generally expressed as p < .05 or more stringently as p <.01. This
expression means that the result occurs less than or equal to five times (or one time) out of a hundred.
When a result occurs this seldom, statisticians assume it did not occur by chance. Each statistical test
reported with the cross-tabulations compares a single group (e.g. African American judges) against all
other groups combined (e.g. non-African American judges). As such, these tests are substantially
overlapping (the comparison between African American and non-African American judges is similar
to the comparison between White and non-White, for instance), and should not be taken to represent
mutually independent findings about the relationships among judge characteristics and case outcomes.
For non-statisticians desiring increased understanding of the above-mentioned statistical techniques,
see ROBERTA GARNER, THE JOY OF STATS 132-34, 189-201 (2005). For discussion of Fisher's test,
see JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 187-90 (3d ed. 2003).

ANALYSIS FOR THE

122. Based in part on the results of the cross-tabulations, we identified judge and case
characteristics that individually appeared to make a significant difference in whether plaintiffs
succeeded or not. We tested these characteristics together in a series of multiple logistic regression
models. Multiple logistic regression is a statistical procedure that allows us simultaneously to evaluate
the statistical significance of the association (i.e., larger than would be expected due to chance)

1140

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:1117

we excluded those judge/case pairs with missing data. 123 Given that a
preliminary analysis indicated that judges in federal district courts and
appellate courts have comparable decision-making patterns 124
in racial
harassment cases, we decided to analyze all cases as one sample.
B. Results of the StatisticalAnalyses

Our study explores how judge characteristics are related to judicial
decision making. In particular, we examined whether judges' race affected
the judges holding for plaintiffs or not. In part because other researchers
have considered how judges' gender and political affiliation are related to
case outcomes, 125 we also included these characteristics in our initial
analysis. A more formalistic model of judicial decision making 126 also
would predict that the factual merits of the case are critical, so we included
in our study certain plaintiffs' claims of racial harassment that our earlier

between multiple judge or case characteristics and whether plaintiffs are successful. DAVID W.
HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 70-79 (2d ed. 2000). By testing
multiple variables simultaneously in this way, we can evaluate whether each characteristic has a
statistically significant relationship with case outcome, while controlling for all others. Logistic
regressions also provide a unified framework in which to examine and test interaction effects, which
indicate whether two (or more) variables together have an effect different than would be expected from
knowledge of their individual effects alone. Finally, we tested for statistical interactions between
variables in the logistic regression models-that is, whether the effect of each variable on case
outcome depends in magnitude and/or direction of the value of another variable. For non-statisticians
desiring further understanding of the above-mentioned techniques, see GARNER, supra note 121, at
156-57; COHEN ET AL., supranote 121, at 354-86, 482-522.
Logistic regression allows us to quantify the strength of each association by providing estimates of
the odds ratios ("OR") for each characteristic. The OR is the ratio between the odds of plaintiffs
success with a certain judge/case characteristic to the odds of success without that characteristic.
Logistic regression provides odds ratio calculations performed simultaneously for each variable in the
model, while controlling for all other variables. See generally J. Martin Bland & Douglas G. Altman,
Statistics Notes: The Odds Ratio, 320 BMJ 1468 (2000), available at http://www.bmj.conVcgi/content/
full/320/7247/1468 (further explaining odds ratios).
If a variable has no effect on case outcomes, the probability of plaintiffs' success will be the same
for both groups of judges, and the odds ratio would be 1.0. Departures from 1.0 in either direction
indicate an association between that variable and case outcomes. An odds ratio greater than 1.0
indicates an increased likelihood that plaintiffs will be successful and an odds ratio less than 1.0
indicates an increased likelihood that plaintiffs will be unsuccessful.
We also performed a measure of the overall explanatory power of each model. We calculated
Nagelkerke's generalized R2 as a measure of the overall explanatory power of each fitted model. R2
represents the proportion of the variance in case outcome explained by the variables in the model
alone. N. J. D. Nagelkerke, A Note on a General Definition of the Coefficient of Determination, 78
BIOMETUKA 691, 691-92 (1991).
123. See infra Appendix A.
124. See supranote 119.
125. See supranote 59.
126. See text accompanying supra note 56.
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127
empirical work indicated as meaningfully related to case outcomes.
Finally, we analyzed whether the plaintiffs' race made a difference.
As we delve more deeply into the study's results, keep in mind that
defendants are much more likely than plaintiffs to win these judicial
proceedings. On average, as shown in Table 3, plaintiffs were successful
about 22% of the time, or about one in five cases. This baseline measure
helps put the decision-making patterns of any one group of judges into
perspective. Thus, when a group of cases deviates considerably from this
baseline, it is particularly noteworthy.

1. Analysis 1: Cross-tabulationsof-Individual Variables with Case
Outcomes
a. Judges' Characteristics.Our data indicate very different decisionmaking patterns for judges of different races. In cases where African
American judges presided, plaintiffs had the highest success rate (45.8%),
as shown in Table 3. In other words, plaintiffs who appear before African
American judges are almost as likely to win as to lose. This success rate is
significantly higher than in cases presided over by judges of other races
considered together (p = .004)128 and is also remarkable because it is well
above the baseline average of 22%. This result is consistent with other
research that African American judges are more likely than White judges
to find for
plaintiff employees in employment discrimination cases
129
generally.
As shown in Table 3, in contrast to cases heard by African American
judges, the plaintiffs' success rate with White and Hispanic judges is much
lower. Cases with Hispanic judges had the lowest plaintiffs' success rate
(19%), followed closely by White judges (20.6%). The plaintiffs' success
rate for Hispanic judges was not significantly different from that for
judges of all other races taken together, 130 while the plaintiffs' success rate
for White judges was significantly different from that for all minority
judges taken together (p = .05). The statistically significant results are
driven primarily by the difference in success rate for African American
and White judges, and indicate that this difference is unlikely to be due to
chance alone.

127. See Chew & Kelley, supranote 97, at 86-88, 106.
128. See supranote 120 (explaining "p" value).
129. See supranotes 79-87 and accompanying text.
130. When Hispanic judges are compared to all other judges, the latter group is composed mostly
of White judges. Since plaintiffs' success rate for Hispanic judges is similar to that for White judges, it
is not surprising that no statistically significant difference occurs.
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Our data included too few cases with Asian American judges to make
meaningful observations. Hopefully, as Asian American and Native
American judges become more numerous, empirical studies will be able to
analyze their decision-making patterns as well. As we observed, the
number of cases in our study where African American and Hispanic
judges preside is small, but the number is acceptable for most analyses in
our exploratory study. 131 When they are not, we note it accordingly.

131.

See supranote 120.
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3:

CROSS-TABULATIONS OF JUDGE CHARACTERISTICS, CASE

CHARACTERISTICS, AND PLAINTIFFS' RACE BY CASE OUTCOMES

Comparison
All cases
Judge characteristics
African American judges vs. all other judges
African American judge (N = 24)
Others (N = 374)
Hispanic judges vs. all other judges
Hispanic judge (N = 21)
Others (N = 377)
Asian American judges vs. all other judges
Asian American judge (N = 3)
Others (N = 395)
White judges vs. all other judges
White judge (N = 350)
Others (N = 48)
Female vs. Male judges
Female judge (N = 78)
Male judge (N = 348)
Republican vs. Democratic judges
Republican judge (N = 235)
Democratic judge (N = 164)
Case characteristics
Racial slurs vs. no racial slurs
Racial slurs (N = 247)
No racial slurs (N = 180)
Both supervisor & coworker harassment vs. not both
Both supervisor & coworker harassment (N 116)
Not both (N = 311)
Plaintiff characteristics
African American plaintiff vs. all other plaintiffs
African American plaintiff (N = 300)
Others (N = 71)
Hispanic plaintiff vs. all other plaintiffs
Hispanic plaintiff (N = 20)
Others (N = 351)
Asian American plaintiff vs. all other plaintiffs
Asian American plaintiff (N = 14)
Others (N = 357)
White plaintiff vs. all other plaintiffs
White plaintiff (N = 37)
Others (N = 334)
* Fisher's exact test used for tables with at least one

Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs
Successful Unsuccessful X2
(dP
%
N
%
N
94
22.0 334
78.0

45.8
20.6

13
297

19.0
22.3

17
293

1
87

33.3
22.0

2
308

66.7
78.0

72
16

20.6
33.3

278
32

79.4
66.6

20
74

25.6
21.3

58
274

74.4
78.7

40
48

17.0
29.3

195
116

83.0
70.7

30.0
11.1

173
160

37.1
16.4

73
260

59
20

19.7
28.2

241
51

7
72

35.0
20.5

13
279

1
78

7.1
21.8

13
279

8.3

.004

*

1.00

*

.53

4.0

.05

0.7

.40

8.4

.004

21.5

<.001

21.0

<.001

2.5

.12

2.4

.12

*

.32

80.3
71.8

3.0
.08
12
32.4
25
67.6
67
20.1
267
79.9
cell with expected frequency < 5.
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Like judges' race, political affiliation appeared significant to case
outcomes. We, like other researchers,132 use the party of the President that
appoints that judge as a proxy for the political affiliation of the judge. As
shown in Table 3, judges appointed by a Democratic President
("Democratic judges") held for the plaintiff in 29.3% of the cases, in
contrast to judges appointed by a Republican President ("Republican
judges") who held for the plaintiff only 17% of the time. These differences
in decision-making patterns were statistically significant (p = .004).
What is striking about the judges' gender was its lack of relevance to
case outcomes, as indicated in Table 3. Unlike Crowe's findings that
judges' gender in sexual harassment cases made a difference to
outcome, 133 our data did not indicate any significant differences between
the way female judges and male judges decided racial harassment cases.
Female judges found for the plaintiffs in 25.6% of the cases and male
judges found for the plaintiff in 21.3% of the cases-a small difference
that could be attributable to chance. Consequently, we dropped gender
from all further analyses.
b. Case Characteristics. As we discussed earlier, 134 in order for
plaintiffs to prove that an employer has violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, plaintiffs must show they experienced harassment that
was "severe or pervasive" and "because of race." Thus, one could
technically argue that the law would not be broken if a judge or jury
believed that racial harassment had occurred but that it was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive, or, in the alternative, if employees were severely or
pervasively harassed but for reasons other than race. While the Supreme
Court has stated these legal principles, federal appellate and district court
judges continue to have substantial discretion in determining whether
plaintiffs have met this burden. Judges are asked, for instance, to consider
"all the circumstances" without clear guidance on the relevant factors. 135
In our earlier study, judges appeared to pay particular attention to
harassment that was blatantly racist, such as harassers who used racial
slurs or brandished racist objects (such as nooses or Ku Klux Klan
attire). 136 We speculated that judges considered this evidence of the
severity and the racial basis of the harassment. 137 In addition, judges

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supranote 54.
See supratext accompanying notes 79-87.
See supratext accompanying notes 107-14.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Chew & Kelley, supranote 97, at 87-88.
Id. at 106-07.
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seemed mindful of whether plaintiffs were harassed by their supervisors
and their coworkers, rather than one or the other. 138 We presumed judges
considered this evidence of the pervasiveness of the harassment and
general hostility toward the plaintiffs. 139 We specifically found that in
cases with racial slurs or harassment by both the supervisors and
coworkers, plaintiffs were significantly more likely to prevail (even
though plaintiffs' overall success rate remained low). 140 In cases where
plaintiffs did not make these claims, but instead argued that more subtle
forms of racial harassment (such as demeaning comments, less attractive
work assignments, and work/social isolation) had
occurred, plaintiffs were
141
likely to lose at a higher rate than the baseline.
This current study added an additional year of data to the earlier one
and retested the relationship between case outcomes and racial slurs or
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers. As shown in Table 3, we
confirmed the earlier patterns. When plaintiffs claimed racial slurs, judges
found in their favor 30% of the time. In contrast, when plaintiffs did not
make these claims, they were successful only 11% of the time. When
plaintiffs claimed evidence of being harassed by both supervisors and
coworkers, they were successful 37% of the time, in comparison to 16% of
the time when they did not make this claim. These results were statistically
significant (p = <.001).
c. Plaintiffs' Race. We considered whether the plaintiffs' race made a
difference to judges of different races. As shown in Table 3, crosstabulations between the plaintiffs' race and case outcomes resulted in
some interesting comparisons. White and Hispanic plaintiffs exhibited the
highest win rates (32.4% and 35%, respectively), African American and
Asian American plaintiffs markedly lower ones (19.7% and 7.1%,
respectively). However, these outcomes
were not statistically significant
142
and so could have occurred by chance.
2. Analysis 2: Logistic Regression of Judges' Race on Case Outcomes
The cross-tabulations give us information about the general decisionmaking patterns of judges. Another versatile statistical method, logistic
regression, provides an alternative process for assessing whether certain

138. Id. at 86-87.
139. Id. at 106-07.
140. Id. at 86-87.
141. Id. at 86-88.
142. While not significant in these cross-tabulations, a logistic regression model did indicate a
significant relationship between particular plaintiffs' race and case outcomes. See infra note 150.
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variables,
such as judges' race, are relevant to the outcome of these
14 3
cases.

We began our logistic regressions by testing the overall significance of
judges' race without consideration of other variables. Because of the small
number of Asian American judges, we included only White, African
American and Hispanic judges in these and subsequent analyses. In each
model, we tested the overall contribution of race (i.e., whether the model
that takes race into account predicts outcomes significantly better than a
model that does not). Given our interests in comparing White versus
minority judges, we also investigated the specific differences between
African American and White judges and between Hispanic and White
judges.
Consistent with the findings in our cross-tabulations, the logistic
regression indicates that judges' race in general is clearly associated with
case outcomes. As indicated in the first line in Table 4, the overall
association between race and outcome is statistically significant (p
-

.02).144
TABLE

Variable
Judges' Race
African American
Judge
v. White Judge
Hispanic Judge
v. White Judge

4:

MODEL WITH JUDGES' RACE

Odds Ratio

Significance Level
.02

3.3

.006

0.9

.87

143. See supra note 122 (explaining logistic regression). We evaluated the explanatory power of
each of our logistic regression models by calculating Nagelkerke's R2. R2 ranges from zero to one and
can be interpreted as the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable (here, plaintiff success)
accounted for by the independent variables (judges' race, judges' political party, presence of racial
slurs and/or presence of both coworker and supervisor harassment). The values of R observed in our
models ranged from R2 = .03 for the model which included only judges' race as an independent
variable to R 2 = .17 for the model including all four independent variables. While these values may not
seem very large and do not indicate that we can use these characteristics to predict the outcome of a
specific case with very great accuracy, they are nevertheless typical of modest but real associations
often reported in the social science literature. Indeed, the R2 value of .17 corresponds to a "medium"
effect size in the widely used nomenclature given by Cohen. JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 80 (2d ed. 1988). For further explanation of the meaning
of R2, see COHEN ET AL., supra note 121, at 91-95. A value of .03 is considered typical of a "small"
effect in Cohen's classification. Id.at 79.
144. Appendix B provides more results for the logistic regression models, including confidence
intervals for the odds ratio, chi-square, and degrees of freedom. See also supra note 120 (explaining
"p" value).
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A closer look at the data, moreover, show some of the same interesting
distinctions between the races that we saw in the cross-tabulations. For
instance, the cross-tabulations indicated that African American judges held
for the plaintiffs much more often than White judges. 145 As shown in
Table 4, the logistic regression further confirmed this result, finding that
the odds are 3.3 times higher (the "odds ratio") 146 that plaintiffs will be
successful when the judge is African American than when the judge is
White. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that this relationship is highly
significant (p = .006), and therefore is not likely to be a product of chance.
In contrast, the logistic regression suggests that it does not make a
significant difference to case outcomes whether the judge is Hispanic as
compared to White.
3. Analysis 3: Judges' Race with Judges' PoliticalAffiliation and
Plaintiffs' Claims
While the cross-tabulations in Analysis 1 indicated that judges' race
was relevant (as did the logistic regressions in Analysis 2), they also
indicated that judges' political affiliation and certain case characteristics
associated with the merits of plaintiffs' claims (claims of racial slurs and
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers) also significantly affect
cases outcomes. Thus, we performed more detailed analyses with judges'
race to gain further insight into what might be occurring. For instance, we
considered judges' race and political affiliation simultaneously (e.g.,
White Democratic judges or African American Republican judges) in
relation to their decision making. Keep in mind, however, that this
subgrouping results in smaller samples in each cell, resulting in reduced
statistical power for significance tests. Consequently, we did not do the
same type of cross-tabulation analysis for significance as we did in
Analysis 1.147
Instead, the first table in each pair of tables below (for example, Table
5) only reports the number and percentage of cases in each cell. The
second table of each pair of tables (for example, Table 6), however, is part
of a series of logistic regression models that considered the effect of each
of these additional variables with judges' race. Logistic regression allows
us to test the effect of judges' race while controlling for the effect of other
variables such as judges' political affiliation. In this way, we can isolate

145.
146.
147.

See supraTable 3.
See supranote 122 (explaining "odds ratio").
See supranote 121.
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the effect of each variable on plaintiffs' success or failure, thus accounting
for the possibility that judges' race is a proxy for something else, such as
political affiliation.
Since the cross-tabulations in Analysis 1 indicated that judges'
gender 148 and plaintiffs' race 149 did not significantly affect case outcomes,

we do not discuss them further in the text of the this Article. Nonetheless,
logistic regression modeling indicated some 1interesting
50
plaintiffs' race that warrants revisiting in the future.

results

on

148. See supraTable 3.
149. See supranote 142 and accompanying text.
150. When we considered judges' race and plaintiffs' race simultaneously with case outcomes, we
found that White judges were more likely to favor defendant-employers regardless of plaintiffs' race.
Even so, White judges were much more inclined to hold for White plaintiffs (32%) and Hispanic
plaintiffs (41%) than for plaintiffs of other races. When appearing before White judges, African
American plaintiffs were about twice as likely to lose their cases as White and Hispanic plaintiffs, and
Asian American plaintiffs lost all their eleven cases before White judges. These simple differences in
case outcomes suggest that White judges are less likely to find credible allegations of racial
harassment from African American and Asian American plaintiffs. Consequently, further research is
warranted to test this finding.
TABLED: PLAINTIFFS' SUCCESS BY JUDGES' RACE AND PLAINTIFFS' RACE

African American Judges
African

ispanicAmerican
P1.
P1.
P1.
7
1
Successful
(43.8%) (50.0%)
P1.
9
1
Unsuccessful (56.3%) (50.0%)
2
16
Totals
(100%)
(100%)

Asian

P1.

--

White Judges
African

Asian

White American Hispanic American White
P1.
P1.
P1.
P1.
P1.
3
46
7
0
10
(60.0%) (18.7%) (41.2%)
(0%)
(32.3%)
2
200
10
11
21
(40.0%) (81.3%) (58.8%) (100%) (67.7%)
31
17
246
5
1311
1(24
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)

In comparison, African American judges were more inclined than White judges to hold for the
plaintiffs, with plaintiffs across all racial groups having closer to a fifty-fifty chance for success,
which is much higher than the baseline of 22%. Although the number of cases is small, the data
suggests that African American judges do not particularly distinguish among plaintiffs of different
races, with White plaintiffs about as likely to be successful as African American plaintiffs. Again,
further research is warranted. Because most plaintiffs are African American and most judges are
White, the number of other judge and plaintiff combinations was very limited.
Our exploratory logistic regression modeling indicates some significant findings between
plaintiffs' race and case outcomes. In a first model with judges' race and African American versus
White plaintiffs, judges' race was significant but plaintiffs' race was not. However, a second model
with judges' race and African American plaintiffs versus White and Hispanic plaintiffs indicated that
judges' race was significant and also the contrast between African American plaintiffs versus White
and Hispanic plaintiffs was significant. This suggests that White and Hispanic plaintiffs' relatively
high win rate is not occurring by chance, and that being White or Hispanic increases one's chance of
winning. At the same time, the significant effect ofjudges' race remains stable.
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a. Judges' Race and PoliticalAffiliation. As shown in Table 5, judges'
political affiliation makes more of a difference for some racial groups than
for others. African American Democratic judges and African American
Republican judges have comparable decision-making patterns, both
groups finding for the plaintiff much more frequently than average (47%
and 43%, respectively). In contrast, plaintiffs coming before White
Democratic judges have a notably higher win rate (27.1%) than those
coming before White Republican judges (16.6%). While the sample is
small, it also appears that the political affiliation of Hispanic judges results
in different case outcomes, with Hispanic Democratic judges more likely
to favor plaintiffs than Hispanic Republican judges. For both White and
Hispanic Republican judges, the plaintiffs' win rate is well below the
baseline for all cases of 22%. The number of cases with Asian American
judges was too small to be meaningful.
TABLE

5:

PLAINTIFFS' SUCCESS BY JUDGES' RACE AND POLITICAL

AFFILIATION
JUDGES' RACE
African
American
Plaintiffs

Dem.
8

3

111

Hispanic

Dem.
3

All Minorities
1

Dem.
12

4

White
Dem.
36

Rep.
36

Successful

(47.1%) (42.9%) (30.0%) (9.1%) (40.0%) (22.2%) (27.1%) (16.6%)

Plaintiffs
Unsuccessful

9
4
7
10
18
14
97
181
(52.9%) (57.1%) (70.0%) (90.9%) (60%) (77.8%) (72.9%) (83.4%)
17
7
10
11
30
18
133
217
0, (100%)
00
(100%) (100%) (100%)
(100%)
(100o) -(1000)(100%)

Totals

TABLE 6: MODEL WITH JUDGES' RACE AND JUDGES' POLITICAL
AFFILIATION
Variable
Judges' Race

Odds Ratio

Significance Level
.07

2.72

.02

.53

.01

African American Judge
v. White Judge

Republican Judge
v. Democratic Judge
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As shown in Table 6, the results of logistic regression analysis also are
striking. 151 Having a Republican judge rather than a Democratic judge is
negatively associated with the plaintiffs success. Specifically, the odds
are .53 times less likely for the plaintiff to be successful when the judge is
Republican than when she or he is Democratic. Logistic regression
analysis, moreover, confirms that the effect of judges' race is generally
stable even when controlling for political affiliation. While the overall
effect of race narrowly missed the significant threshold of .05 in this
model, 152 the effect of the judge being African American rather than White
remains significant (p = .02) even after taking into account whether the
judge is a Democratic or a Republican appointee and vice-versa. Since
these relationships are statistically significant, they are unlikely to have
occurred by chance.
b. Judges' Race and Racial Slurs. We also considered the association
between judges' race and cases in which the plaintiff complains about an
explicit form of racial harassment-the harasser's use of racial slurs. As
we earlier discussed, 153 judges seem to consider racial slurs as evidence of
two key elements of the claim: that the harassment was (1) sufficiently
"severe or pervasive" and (2) "because of race." As shown in Table 7,
minority judges are much more likely to find for the plaintiff if racial slurs
are present. Indeed, there is a 60% success rate for these plaintiffs when
before African American judges. Plaintiffs who complain of racial slurs
before White judges are about twice as likely to lose than if they complain
to African American judges, with a success rate of only 27.6%.
The percentage increase in plaintiffs' success rate when they claim
racial slurs before African Americans judges or White judges, however, is
comparable. Compared to African American judges' overall baseline of a
46% plaintiffs' win rate, 154 plaintiffs alleging racial slurs had a 60% win
rate, representing a 30% increase. Compared to White judges' baseline of

151. As indicated in Table 4, the difference between Hispanic judges and White judges in their
case holdings was not statistically significant (i.e., the difference may be occurring by chance).
Similarly, in the remaining logistic regression models, the difference also was not significant (p =
between .78 and .99). To simplify the remaining tables in the text, we did not include this data in the
tables here but the data is included in Appendix B.
152. The observation of the overall race effect losing significance with the addition of another
variable to the model is a common phenomenon in regression models. Adding more variables entails
estimating more model parameters, which in turn causes the uncertainty in all other estimates to grow.
However, since the African American judge versus White judge comparison remained significant and
the magnitude of the odds ratio for this comparison is relatively stable, we are confident in our
conclusion that this racial effect is stable when controlling for political affiliation.
153. See discussion accompanying supranotes 133-35.
154. See supraTable 3.
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20.6% plaintiffs' win rate, 55 plaintiffs
alleging racial slurs had a 27.6%
156
win rate, representing a 34% increase.
As shown in Table 8, when we consider the judges' race and the
plaintiffs' claim of racial slurs, the analysis indicates that plaintiffs who
make this claim increase their odds for success substantially (OR = 3.4).
Furthermore, the effect of the judge being African American rather than
White remains significant (p = .008).
TABLE 7: PLAINTIFFS' SUCCESS BY JUDGES' RACE AND CLAIMS OF

RACIAL SLURS
JUDGES' RACE

Plaintiffs Successful
When Racial Slurs
Claimed
Plaintiffs
Unsuccessfl When
Racial Slurs
Claimed
Totals

African
American

Hispanic

Asian
American

All Minorities

White

9 (60%)

4(40%)

1 (33.3%)

14 (50%)

54 (27.6%)

6 (40%)

6 (60%)

2 (66.7)%

14 (50%)

142 (72.4%)

15((100%)

10(100%)

3(100%)

28(100%)

196(100%)

TABLE 8: MODEL WITH JUDGES' RACE AND RACIAL SLURS
Variable
Judges' Race
African American Judge
v. White Judge
Racial Slurs

Odds Ratio

Significance Level
.03

3.3
3.4

.008
<.001

155. See supraTable 3.
156. Compared to Hispanic judges' baseline of 19% plaintiffs' win rate (shown in Table 3),
plaintiffs with racial slurs had a 40% win rate (110% increase). However, the number of cases is so
small that it is difficult to generalize from this result. But see supra note 120 (explaining small sample
sizes).
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c. Judges' Race and Composition of Harassers. As we earlier
discussed, 157 judges as a group appear to consider harassment by both
supervisors and coworkers as an indicator of the pervasiveness of the
harassment and the general hostility in the work environment, thus
bolstering the plaintiffs case. In contrast to the results for racial slurs, 158
White and African American judges exhibited comparable decisionmaking patterns in cases where the plaintiffs made this claim, as indicated
in Table 9. Plaintiffs are successful 37.2% of the time before White judges
and 46.2% of the time before African American judges. These data
suggest that both White and African American judges associate this claim
with a finding of racial harassment. Keep in mind, however, that the
increase in plaintiffs' success when this claim is present is much greater
for White than for African American judges. Compared to White judges'
baseline of 20.6% plaintiffs' win rate, 159 plaintiffs who claimed
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers won 37.2% of the time
(81% increase).1 60 The percentage increase in plaintiffs' success for
African American judges is very slight. 161 The number of these cases with
Hispanic judges was too small to allow meaningful observations.
TABLE 9: PLAINTIFFS' SUCCESS BY JUDGES' RACE AND COMPOSITION OF
HARASSERS
JUDGES' RACE

African
Plaintiffs Successful
When Both Supervisor &

Asian
Hispanic

6 (46.2%)

1 (33.3%)

7 (53.8%)

2 (66.7%)

13(100%)

3(100%) 1

All

Minorities

White

-

7 (43.8%)

35 (37.2%)

-

9 (56.3%)

59 (62.8%)

16 (100%)

94 (100%)

American

American

Coworkers Harassers
Plaintiffs Unsuccessful
When Both Supervisor &

Coworkers Harassers
Totals

157. See supradiscussion accompanying notes 140-41.
158. See supraTables 7 and 8.
159. See supraTable 3.
160. Given the disproportionate number of White judges, their reaction to this claim is probably
driving the impact on case outcomes as a whole.
161.

45.8% versus 46.2%.
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TABLE 10: MODEL WITH JUDGES' RACE AND COMPOSITION OF
HARASSERS

Variable

Odds Ratio

Judges' Race

Significance Level
.12

African American Judge
v. White Judge
Harassment by Both
Supervisors & Coworkers

2.5

.04

3.1

<.001

As shown in Table 10, the plaintiffs' claims that both supervisors and
coworkers harassed them also significantly improves their odds of success
(OR = 3.1). Furthermore, the difference in outcome between African
American and White judges remained significant (p = .04).
d. All Variables. Finally, we designed a logistic regression model to
test simultaneously all the variables described above. As shown in Table
11, this cumulative analysis showed that plaintiffs' claims of racial slurs or
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers increases the odds of
plaintiffs succeeding, but having a presiding Republican judge harms the
plaintiffs' chances for success. All of these relationships were statistically
significant. In particular, this logistic regression model of all variables
predicts the following:
(1) The odds are .5 times less likely for plaintiffs to be successful
when the judge is Republican (rather than a Democrat);
(2) The odds are 2.7 times higher that plaintiffs will be successful
when they allege racial slurs; and
(3) The odds are 2.5 times higher that plaintiffs will be successful if
the alleged harassers are both supervisors and coworkers.
TABLE 11: MODEL WITH ALL VARIABLES
Variable
Judges' Race
African American Judge
vs. White Judge
Republican Judge
vs. Democratic Judge
Racial Slurs
Harassment by Both
Supervisors & Coworkers

Odds Ratio

Significance Level
.25

2.2

.10

0.5
2.7

.003
.001

2.5

.001
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The race of the judge continued to have a strong effect on the outcome
of the case (OR = 2.2 for African American judges as compared to White
judges), but this effect was no longer quite statistically significant in this
model (p = .10). This means that we can have less confidence that the
observed differences in success rate of cases heard by White and African
American judges are not due to chance. As noted above, 162 a typical trait
of regression models is that increasing the number of independent
variables increases our uncertainty in the effect of each variable. However,
we feel that the magnitude of the odds ratio for the comparison between
African American and White judges and the consistent results of all the
other models provide strong evidence that judges' race is meaningful to
case outcomes,
even when controlling for several other important
163
variables.
e. Interaction of All Variables. Our analyses thus far have indicated
that each variable (judges' race, judges' political affiliation, and plaintiffs'
claims of racial slurs and harassment by both supervisors and coworkers)
is significant on its own in affecting case outcomes, a condition
statisticians call "main effects. 164 Furthermore, our analyses assume that
these effects are additive, so that judges' race, judges' political affiliation,
and plaintiffs' claims are each independently meaningful. Thus, having a
White judge decreases a plaintiffs chance for success, and having a
Republican judge decreases a plaintiffs chance for success further and
independently of having a White judge. Similarly, having an African
American judge increases a plaintiff s chance for success; plus, claims of
racial slurs increase the plaintiffs chances even more, independently of
the judge's race. For example, our earlier logistic regression model
predicted that plaintiffs appearing before an African American judge
increase their odds of winning 3.3 times and having a case involving racial
slurs increase their odds of winning by 3.4 times. 165 Thus, plaintiffs in
cases with both conditions would benefit from the additive effect.

162. See supra note 152.
163. The results of this final model do seem to indicate that accounting for judges' political
affiliation, racial slurs and harassment by both supervisors and coworkers simultaneously does reduce
the additional explanatory power of judges' race. This is in part attributable to the small number of
African American judges as compared to White judges. As their absolute numbers and relative
percentages increase to be comparable to the other variables, such as the Republican-Democratic
comparison, we would expect their statistical effect to be more powerful.
164. See supra note 121.
165. See supra Table 8.
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In addition to the above analyses, we also performed a series of
multiple-logistic regression models to discover any interactive effects
between the variables; that is whether a multiplicative effect exists. For
instance, does the judge being African American while simultaneously
having a case with racial slurs result in a heightened effect beyond the
additive effect described above? Our analyses did not provide any
evidence that it does. We tested every possible two-way interaction
between the variables in Table 11 (judges' race, judges' political party,
presence versus absence of racial slurs, and presence versus absence of
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers). The results showed no
statistically significant interaction effects between the judges' race and any
of the other variables. 166 However, we stress that the small sample sizes
for non-White judges limit the statistical power to detect all but the
strongest interactions and, as such, our absence of interaction findings here
should not be taken as positive evidence that such interactions do not, in
fact, exist.
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

While judges have historically been White, a modern influx of
minorities into the judiciary has changed the institution's racial
composition and resulted in a larger but still unrepresentative proportion
of minority judges. Disagreement exists, however, about how a larger
minority presence on the bench would affect legal institutions. Under a
more formalist model of judicial decision making, all judges, whether
White or minority, are guided by presumably objective and race-neutral
legal principles and interpretations. 167 Thus, White and minority judges,
even if they were inclined, do not have the discretion to affect judicial
results in a unique way. The merits of the case are the key to case
outcomes. Thus, under this formalist model, it makes little difference to
case outcomes if all the judges are White, minority, or some combination.
In contrast, a realist model 168 would posit that the personal attributes of
judges meaningfully affect the way they make judicial decisions. A
homogeneous judiciary of Whites differs from one made up of a more
racially diverse judiciary because each racial group has different
viewpoints. Individuals' social location in our race-sensitive social system
affects their experiences and their consciousness both within and beyond

166. See infra Appendix C.
167. See supratext accompanying note 56.
168. See supratext accompanying note 55.
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legal settings. Judges do not leave race "at the door" when entering the
courtroom. Rather, their social and cultural experiences are the raw
material for their interpretation of laws, just as they are for their ongoing
construction of social life generally.
A. Judges' Race and Case Outcomes
Our empirical study of over 400 federal workplace racial harassment
cases between 1981 and 2003169 resulted in striking yet sometimes
nuanced findings. In a nutshell, our results provide evidence of both the
formalist model and the realist model of judicial decision making. We
found that the race of judges matters, as does their political affiliation. On
the other hand, our findings also indicate that judges of all races are
attentive to the merits of the case.
Our work initially confirms certain characteristics of racial harassment
cases: the vast majority of the judges are White; the vast majority of the
plaintiff-employees are African American; the vast majority of accused
harassers are White; and that, when studying case outcomes, plaintiffemployees have a very poor win rate in general-succeeding in only 22%
of cases overall. Furthermore, the statistical analyses consistently showed
that the race of the judge can make a significant difference. While
plaintiffs have a poor win rate in general, they are much more likely to win
if their cases come before African American rather than White judges.
Plaintiffs are successful in 46% of their cases before African American
judges but less than half as often before White judges; logistic regression
analysis indicated that on average, plaintiffs before African 1American
70
judges are 3.3 times more likely to win than before White judges.
Thus, while we cannot predict how any individual judge might act, our
study results strongly suggest that African American judges as a group and
White judges as a group perceive racial harassment differently. Racial
harassment law asks judges to determine if the claims of plaintiffs, who
are most often African American, are credible. These determinations often
boil down to two key inquiries: (1) Did the plaintiffs suffer harassment

169. While the first case to recognize the racial harassment doctrine, Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), occurred in 1971, the first case in our sample
occurred in 1981.
170. Interestingly, the decision-making patterns of Hispanic judges were very similar to White
judges, holding for plaintiffs in only 19% of their cases. See supra Table 3. Keep in mind, however,
that unlike the results for African American and White judges, the results for Hispanic judges were not
significantly different from other races and therefore could have occurred by chance. But see supra
note 130.
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because of their race (rather than for some reason unrelated to racial
animus)?; and (2) Was the harassment so "severe or pervasive" that it
resulted in a hostile work environment? African Americans and Whites
apparently subscribe to different worldviews. Our study results suggest
that if presented with comparable facts, they often reach different
conclusions about whether discrimination is present. Our findings indicate
that judges are not different from people in general. Although society has
made progress, racial harassment and discrimination continue to pervade
American life. 171 African American judges can personally identify with
instances of discriminatory treatment. Thus, when plaintiffs describe being
racially harassed, African American judges can imagine that possibility172
have a racial consciousness-in a way that White judges do not.
Even in sexual harassment lawsuits, judges as a group are more likely
to empathize with the female plaintiffs who claim that a male supervisor
or coworker has sexually harassed them. 173 Female judges find sexual
harassment a plausible possibility, given the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in American society. We hypothesize that male judges also are
more open to plaintiffs' sexual harassment complaints because of their

171. The recent presidential campaign process provided examples of explicit racism. See Jim
Geraghty, Just in Time for West Virginia, A Spotlight on Racist Anti-Obama Voters, NATIONAL
REVIEW ONLINE, May 13, 2008, http://campaignspot.nationalreview.com/post/?q=YjgwY2ZhMjg
0MWRiODgzMmFkOWR1MWZkNjQ1MDhlYzg=; Kevin Merida, Racist Incidents Give Some
Obama CampaignersPause, WASH. POST, May 13, 2008, at AO1.
172. Furthermore, our analyses provide tentative evidence that White judges may find it more
difficult to identify with plaintiffs of some races than others on their harassment claims. As described
in detail above, supra note 150, before White judges, African American plaintiffs were about twice as
likely to lose as White plaintiffs, and Asian Americans lost every case. Interestingly, White judges
were about as favorably disposed toward Hispanic plaintiffs as White plaintiffs. This result could
reflect White judges' ambivalence about Hispanics' racial identify, perhaps perceiving them as White,
or it might be explained by particularly strong plaintiffs' arguments in the relatively small number of
cases in which Hispanics were plaintiffs. Keep in mind, however, that the distributions of plaintiffs of
different races against judges of different races for the most part produced small numbers of cases in
each cell, making statistical conclusions difficult.
While there are fewer cases to study, it tentatively appears that African American judges can more
readily empathize with plaintiffs across races. The win rate was about the same for White plaintiffs,
African American plaintiffs, and Hispanic plaintiffs that came before them-with about half of all
these plaintiffs winning, a rate well above the 22% baseline. See supra Table 3. Hispanic judges heard
mainly cases with African American plaintiffs, and held in their favor only 20% of the time. See supra
Table 3. It could be that Hispanic judges, like White judges, cannot readily identify with African
American plaintiffs. It also could be that Hispanic judges are more likely to hold extremely high
standards for racial harassment claims regardless of the plaintiffs race. In the absence of more cases
with plaintiffs of other races before minority judges, we can only offer very tentative patterns to study
further in the future.
173. See, e.g., Juliano & Schwab, supra note 98, at 594 (indicating the plaintiffs' success rate as
48.2% in sexual harassment cases, considering 51.2% rate in district courts and 3 9 % in appellate
courts).
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identification with or inclination to be protective of women in their lives,
such as wives and daughters. In contrast, White judges in a racial
harassment lawsuit may not identify with, or have any reason to be
protective of, minority plaintiffs. They rarely, perhaps because of a general
lack of close interpersonal relationships with African Americans, have a
personal basis for connecting with or being sympathetic toward a minority
plaintiff who claims racial harassment.
B. Judges'Race andJudges' PoliticalAffiliation
Judges' political affiliation also plays a role in their decision making. A
significant difference marks case outcomes for judges appointed by
Democratic Presidents and judges appointed by Republican Presidents:
Democratic judges are more likely to find for plaintiffs (29.3%) than their
Republican peers (17%). Considering together the judges' race and the
judges' political affiliations offers some interesting insights. Plaintiffs
experience the highest win rate before African American Democratic
judges (47%), but are followed closely by plaintiffs before African
American Republican judges (43%). A greater contrast exists between the
rulings of White Democratic (27%) and White Republican judges (17%).
However, the judges' race remains a stronger influence than the
judges' political affiliation, as suggested by the 20% difference in
plaintiffs' win rate between White Democratic judges and African
American Democratic judges. Logistic regression analyses also confirm
that both the judges' political affiliation and the judges' race are
independently significant to case outcomes, and that the judge's race has
more of an effect. For instance, the modeling indicates that while having a
Republican judge decreases the plaintiffs chance of winning by an
average of 0.5, appearing before an African American judge increases the
plaintiff's chance of winning by about three times.
What explains these results? Judges' political ideologies may well
affect their assessment of racial harassment cases given that racial
discrimination is a subject on which citizens hold divergent political
views. Research suggests those who identify as conservatives are less
supportive of policies and laws that protect minorities. 174 For African
American Republicans, however, their race seems more salient than their

174. See Maria Krysan, Prejudice, Politics, and Public Opinion: Understanding the Sources of
Racial Policy Attitudes, 26 ANNu. REV. Soc. 135, 146 (2000) (summarizing research indicating that

"people who prefer a limited government or identify their ideology as conservative tend to oppose
equal treatment policies, government spending on blacks, and preferences in hiring and promotion.").
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political ideology, at least in the type of cases we have been considering.
Perhaps African Americans, regardless of their political affiliation, can
identify with being targets of racial harassment. After all, racial harassers
presumably do not distinguish African American employees who are
Democrats from those who are Republicans.
Our findings also help us better understand why the justice system in
general seems so inhospitable to plaintiffs' racial harassment claims. In
our study of judges, Republicans outnumbered Democrats and Whites
substantially outnumbered African Americans, with about 60% of the
cases heard by Republican judges and about 80% of the cases heard by
White judges. Given the propensity for Republicans and for Whites to
deny plaintiffs' claims, it is not surprising that plaintiffs as a group are
successful in only one out of five cases.
C. Judges' Race and Merits of the Case
Our study also considered plaintiffs' specific allegations, in particular
that harassers used racial slurs or that both supervisors and coworkers
participated in harassing them. As in earlier research, our data indicated
that judges as a group pay considerable attention to both claims,
presumably because they are viewed as factual evidence that the
harassment was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" and "because of race"-both key elements in the plaintiffs case. As compared to the baseline
plaintiffs' success rate of 22%, when plaintiffs claim racial slurs, they win
30% of the time. When they claim harassment by both supervisors and
coworkers, they win 37% of the time. Logistic regression analyses further
indicated that these claims were independently significant from both
judges' race and judges' political party. Furthermore, they had a
substantial effect on case outcomes, with claims of racial slurs improving
the plaintiffs' odds by a factor of three. Meanwhile, claims of harassment
by both supervisors and coworkers increased the plaintiffs' odds for
success by 2.8. A closer look at how judges of different races factored in
these claims revealed some important patterns. Both African American
and White judges paid comparable attention to racial slurs, being about
one-third more likely to hold for the plaintiffs.
What occurs when plaintiffs make these claims? It appears that judges
of all races have a heightened sensitivity to racial slurs. While White
judges may not be attentive to more subtle forms of racism, racial slurs are
by definition evidence of race-based harassment and are illustrative of
severe and socially unacceptable abuse. While Hispanic judges may not
generally identify with African American plaintiffs, they apparently
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recognize the significance of racial slurs. Not surprisingly, African
American judges also appreciated the clear derogatory intent of racial
slurs.
It is also interesting to explore the judges' reaction to plaintiffs' claim
of harassment by both supervisors and coworkers. White judges gave this
claim the greatest weight, with the plaintiffs' success rate significantly
improving by more than 80%. This claim did not seem to make much
difference to African American judges, with plaintiffs' success rate with
this claim being about the same as the rate before African American
judges in general. Too few cases with this claim came before Hispanic
judges to make a meaningful observation.
Perhaps White judges perceive harassment by both supervisors and
coworkers as strong evidence of pervasive harassment and see this kind of
"ganging up" on an employee as contrary to fair play. Furthermore, if a
harasser acted alone, it may be easier to explain the harassment as
interpersonal conflict or one person's crude attempt at humor, rather than
as conduct motivated by racial animus. For African American judges,
given their own experiences with broad-based societal discrimination, all
these distinctions may not be particularly salient. Perhaps they perceive
racial harassment as likely to be perpetrated by one person or a group and
that supervisors are as likely as others to engage in it.
These results then suggest that judges pay attention to the factual
merits of each case. Bear in mind, however, that even with these claims,
judges do not automatically hold for the plaintiff. For instance, while
plaintiffs' odds for success improve when they claim racial slurs, they still
lose 40% of the time with African American judges and more than 70% of
the time with White judges.
VI. CONCLUSION

Every year, thousands of employees, most of them African Americans,
accuse their supervisors or coworkers of racial harassment. Many disputes
find their way to the federal courts, where judges, most often White, have
to decide whether these claims are credible or not. A formalist model of
judicial decision making posits that it does not matter whether the judge is
White or some other race because judges are required to decide cases on
the merits of the case and that this process is objective. A realist model of
judicial decision making proposes instead that judges' race does make a
difference since judges, like everyone else, are products of their own
societal experiences and social forces.
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Our empirical study provides some comfort and consternation for both
judicial models. Our multiple statistical analyses clearly indicate that
judges of different races do exhibit significantly different decision-making
patterns. 175 White judges are more likely than their African American
counterparts to favor employer defendants, often granting their motions
for summary judgment. African American judges are more likely to
believe that employees have credible grievances of racial harassment. At
the same time, it appears that both African American and White judges
recognize relevant factual features of the case, such as whether the
harassment included racial slurs or harassment by both coworkers and
supervisors. Thus, neither group is inattentive to the legal principles;
rather they differ in their interpretation and understanding of the dispute.
Our findings may disturb individuals across the political spectrum.
Some may view it as evidence that African American judges are biased
and pro-plaintiff in racial harassment cases, while White judges protect
traditional judicial norms. Others may conclude that White judges are
predisposed against racial harassment cases, discriminate against African
American plaintiffs, and favor employer-defendants and accused
harassers.
However, one message is clear from the data: race matters in judicial
decision making. It affects outcomes even when we take into account the
judge's political affiliation or case characteristics. While we might have
intuitively expected the judge's race to make a difference, this study
provides empirical proof.
The remaining question is why race matters. Our interpretation is that
race affects a judge's ability to appreciate the perspective of a plaintiff of
another race. Thus, White judges as a group are less able to identify and
empathize with African American plaintiffs, making it inherently more
difficult to find the plaintiffs' arguments plausible and credible. This
interpretation helps explain why White judges deny African American
plaintiffs' claims so often. In contrast, it appears that African American
judges are more capable of transcending their own demography and do not
let color influence their decision making. They can identify with African
American plaintiffs, but also with plaintiffs of other races. At the same
time, African American judges still discern between more or less credible
claims, holding for plaintiffs only about half of the time.

175. See supra text accompanying notes 128-63. As explained in text accompanying notes 16465, when all variables were simultaneously considered, the role that judges' race plays loses some
statistical significance (as one might expect with the larger number of variables).
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Racial harassment cases often involve motions for summary judgment
where judges are asked to study the facts to determine if the harassment
was "because of race" rather than for a race-neutral reason and if the
harassment was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to result in a hostile and
intimidating work environment. African American judges' experiences
give them valuable knowledge, perspectives, and understandings of
minority plaintiffs that many Whites lack (while White judges provide
insights on the harassment of White employees). Since African American
judges have likely experienced discrimination themselves, they can
recognize more complex and subtle forms of racial harassment. Given that
subtle and nuanced forms of discrimination are more prevalent today than
blatant forms, the greater sensitivity of African American judges aids other
judges in interpreting ambiguous interactions between plaintiffs and their
alleged harassers. The multiple subjectivities of a racially diverse judiciary
thus help unveil the complex reality and accurate "objectivity" of racial
dynamics in the workplace.
Since our study found that the racial make-up of the judiciary affects
outcomes, a more diverse judiciary will bring more diverse views on what
constitutes racial harassment-ideally reflecting the range of views across
all racial groups in society. 17 6 With 80% of all federal judges (and 89% of
all state judges) being White and our findings that White judges rule less
favorably for racial harassment plaintiffs (who are typically African
American), it is not surprising that some minorities place little faith in the
judicial system. 177 If people of all races are to believe in judicial fairness, a
more diverse bench is a good place to start. Plaintiffs are less likely to feel
marginalized when their experiences are viewed seriously. They are thus
more likely to conclude the legal system is not biased. Legal principles
prevail but are interpreted with the benefit of varied perspectives that are
integral to the just resolution of racial harassment cases. Our study
reinforces the need for the judiciary to be representative of the public it
serves. Judges do not make decisions in racial harassment cases in a color-

176. Likewise, given our findings regarding judges' political affiliation, it is not surprising that the
judicial appointment process has become so politicized. Republicans want to appoint new judges that
are "Republican" in their judicial orientation and Democrats want to appoint judges that are
"Democratic" in their orientation.
177. See CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 57 (describing studies that indicate minorities are more
likely than other groups to believe that unequal treatment in the courts occurs frequently and that court
outcomes are "seldom or never fair").
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blind legal system. As a legal community
and as a diverse society, we
178
should not be blind to the color of judges.

178. Additional information on research methodology is available firom the authors and in Chew
& Kelley, supra note 97.
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A: DATA SET SUMMARY
Number of Cases

Judges' Race
White
Aftican American
Hispanic
Asian American
All minority
Unknown
Judges' Gender
Female
Male
Unknown
Mixed Race Judicial Panels
Mixed Gender Judicial Panels
Judicial Circuit
First
Second
Fifth
Seventh
Ninth
Eleventh
Magistrate Judges
Foreign-born Judges
Judges' Birth
Pre-1946
1946-1964
Post-1965
Unknown
Judges' Political Affiliation
1st Appointment by Democratic President
1st Appointment by Republican President
Unknown
President Appointing Judges
Reagan
Clinton
Carter
Bush (H.)
Nixon
All Other Presidents
Unknown
Judges with LLM Degree
Judges with Clerkship
Judges with Gov. Experience
Judges with Teaching Experience
Judges with Law Firm Experience
Judges with Military Service
Plaintiffs Successful
Defendants Successful

351
24
21
3
48
29
78
349
1
39
60
9
80
68
154
65
52
64
20
295
127
1
5
169
231
28
128
89
54
52
32
45
28
32
143
289
128
370
183
94
353
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APPENDIX B: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS FOR MAIN EFFECTS
Variable
Judges' Race
African American Judge vs. White Judge
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge

X2

OR* LCL** UCL**
3.27
0.91

1.41
0.30

7.7
7.60 7.6
2.78 <0.1

df
2
1
1

p
.02
.006
.87

R =.03
*Odds ratio
9
** 5% Confidence interval for OR
OR* LCL** UCL**

Judges' Race
African American Judge vs. White Judge
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge
Republican Judge vs. Democratic Judge
R2 =.05

2.72
0.85
0.53

1.15
0.28
0.33

6.43
2.64
0.87

x

2

df

5.4
5.2
.08
6.3

2
1
1
1

p
.07
.02
.78
.01

*Odds ratio
95
%Confidence interval for OR

**

OR* LCL** UCL**
Judges' Race
African American Judge vs. White Judge
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge
Racial Slurs

3.28
1.00
3.35

1.36
0.32
1.93

x2

df

p
2
.03
1 .008
1
.99
1 <.001

df

p
2
.12
1
.04
1
.90
1 <.001

7.1
7.89 7.0
3.15 <0.1
5.82 18.4

R =.11
*Odds ratio
9
** 5% Confidence interval for OR

OR* LCL** UCL**
Judges' Race
African American Judge vs. White Judge
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge
Harassers Both Supervisors & Coworkers

2.54
1.07
3.08

1.05
0.34
1.86

x2

4.3
6.13 4.3
3.37 <0.1
5.13 18.9

R .10
*Odds ratio
9
** 5% Confidence interval for OR

ALL VARIABLES
OR* LCL** UCL**
Judges' Race
African American Judge vs. White Judge
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge
Republican Judge vs. Democratic Judge
Racial Slurs
Harassers Both Supervisors & Coworkers
R =.17

*Odds ratio
**9 5 %Confidence interval for OR

2.16
1.06
0.45
2.69
2.50

0.87
0.33
0.27
1.49
1.44

5.36
3.45
0.76
4.85
4.33

x2

2.7
2.7
<0.1
8.9
10.8
10.7

df
2
1
1
1
1
1

p
.25
.10
.92
.003
.001
.001
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APPENDIX C: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS FOR TWO-WAY INTERACTIONSt

Interaction term

X2

df

p

Judge's race * Judge's political party
Judge's race * Racial slurs
Judge's race * Both supervisor and coworker
harassment
Judge's political party * Racial slurs
Judge's political party * Both supervisor and
coworker harassment
Racial slurs * Both supervisor and coworker
harassment

0.2
1.2
1.5

2
2
2

.89
.55
.47

1.9
0.2

1
1

.17
.65

3.2

1

.08

t Each test represents the effect of the interaction term specified in a logistic regression
model that also includes the main effects of a judge's race, a judge's political party, racial
slurs, and both supervisor and coworker harassment.

